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Of the twelve substantive items on the UNCTAD
V agenda, four dealt wholly with trade and a
further five made detailed reference to it. The
subjects of these agenda items, with relevant sub-
items, are listed in Table I. The purpose of this
article is to outline these items, the treatment they
were given in the four weeks of negotiations at
Manila and to consider briefly future develop-
ments. The broader implications are examined
elsewhere in this Bulletin.
Table 1
Trade Issues on UNCTAD V's Agenda:
Item Number and Subject
Evaluation of the world trade and economic
situation
Developments in international trade
Protectionism
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
lo. Commodities
Integrated Programme for Commodities
Other elements
11. Manufactures and semi-manufactures
Measures to expand and diversify ldc
exports
Restrictive business practices
Generalised System of Preferences
Review of Resolutions 96(1V) (on pro-
tectionism) and 97(1V) (on TNCs)
12. Monetary and financial issues
a) An International Monetary System to
foster world trade
14. Shipping
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
Ldcs' participation in world shipping
15. Least developed countries
Trade relations among countries with different
economic and social systems
Economic cooperation among ldcs
The Agenda and the Group of 77's Demands
The failure of conferences is often blamed on
inadequate preparation. Considerable effort was
therefore expended in setting up UNCTAD V.
The agenda was drawn up by the Trade and
Development Board of UNCTAD in September
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1978. Although passed by a consensus, its contents
largely reflected the concerns of the 117 ldcs
forming the 'Group of 77'. By early 1979
UNCTAD had begun to publish a series of
background reports presenting the main policy
issues which, in its view, should be considered
under each item. These were spelt out further by
the 77 when they published the Arusha Pro-
gramme for Collective Self-Reliance and Frame-
work for Negotiations (UNCTAD (1) 1979)
following a meeting at Arusha, Tanzania, in
February. There were five main themes, which we
will consider here.
Protectionism
Protectionism and the need for structural change
in the world economy were to be the subjects of
the first substantive items (nos. 8, 9 and 11) at
UNCTAD V, following the initial procedural
items. Item 8 was to provide the underlying
theme for the Conference. It called for a review
of the world economy and a discussion of the
measures which could be undertaken to strengthen
it. As Table 2 shows, growth in both dcs and ldcs
has slowed down in recent years. The 77 wanted
the dcs, in particular the market economies
forming Group B, to recognise that the current
international economic system was inequitable,
inefficient, and was suffering not from cyclical but
from structural depression (UNCTAD 1979:
paras 14-192). They felt the dcs were mistaken in
assuming that their reflationary policies could
revitalise the world economy by some 'trickle-
down' effect. What the 77 sought was a new inter-
national economic convention.
Item 9a) underlined further the interdependence
of dc and ldc economies and argued that the
growing use of protectionist measures by dcs
would not solve their domestic problems. Restric-
tions on ldc exports would simply reduce their
capacity to import from dcs. Since the ides form
a significant and growing market (see Table 3),
such a reduction could hit the dcs badly. In
1974-77, for example, ldcs bought nearly a
quarter of market economy dc exports, compared
with less than a fifth in 1970-73. In place of self-
defeating protectionism, the 77 proposed inter alia
that Group B accept international supervision of
their barriers by an UNCTAD group of experts,
which would ensure that barriers were used only
under strict conditions and, in particular, that
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Table 2
Economic Growth in Major Country Groups
(per cent per annum)
Excluding China and other socialist countries of Asia.
2 Per capita income below $400 in 1976.
Table 3
Direction of Trade of Developed and Developing Countries, 1970-77
Source: UNCTAD (1979: Add.l)
1 Excluding small amounts of exports unallocated by destination.
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Developed
market-
economy
countries
Developing
countries
Social ist
Countries
of Eastern
Europe
Total' Developed
market-
economy
countries
Developing
countries
Socialist
countries
of Eastern
Europe
Total
bn fob per cent
Developed market-
economy countries
Average 1970-73 227.0 54.1 9.9 291.0 78.0 18.6 3.4 100
Average 1974-77 443.9 143.0 27.1 614.0 72.3 23.3 4.4 100
Developing countries
Average 1970-73 54.8 15.6 3.3 73.7 74.4 21.1 4.5 100
Average 1974-77 174.7 55.0 8.9 238.5 73.2 23.1 3.7 100
Socialist countries
of Eastern Europe
Average 1970-73 9.3 4.9 23.1 37.4 24.8 13.2 62.0 100
Average 1974-77 22.6 11.0 44.7 78.3 28.9 14.0 57.1 100
Change in total GDP
1960-70 1970-73 1973-77
Change in GDP per head
1960-70 1970-73 1973-77
Developed market-economy
countries 4.9 5.1 2.1 3.9 4.1 1.1
Socialist countries of
Eastern Europe 6.7 6.6 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.0
Developing countries:
Total 5.3 6.3 5.4 2.8 3.7 2.8
Medium- and high-income
countries 6.0 7.8 5.9 3.2 5.0 3.1
Low-income countries2 4.1 3.0 4.1 1.7 0.6 1.7
of which least developed 3.1 3.2 3.3 0.8 0.8 0.9
Source: UNCTAD (1979: Add.l)
Exportstotsto Values Shares
there should be no discrimination between ldcs.
They also proposed that another UNCTAD body
be set up to formulate and monitor longer-term
adjustment policies in specific countries and
sectors. The socialist countries of Eastern Europe
(Group D) were not excluded from the attack:
the UNCTAD Secretariat suggested that 'in the
light of the evolving international division of
labour the socialist countries of Eastern Europe
might also give consideration, where appropriate,
to carry out on a long-term, stable basis, struc-
tural changes. . . .' (UNCTAD 1979a: para 39).
Under item 9h) the 77 wanted the Conference
to assess the results emerging from the multi-
lateral trade negotiations (MTN), currently being
wound up in Geneva, to examine how far the dcs
had complied with their commitment to grant
ldcs special and differential treatment in the
MTN, and to discuss whether any last-minute
changes could improve on what the idcs felt would
otherwise be negative results. Ldcs were particu-
larly worried that the planned most favoured
nation (mfn) tariff reductions would erode the
preferential tariff margins on their exports to dcs,
which benefit from the GSP, and that these
losses would exceed the benefits accruing to them
in the form of lower mfn tariffs on their exports
which are not covered by the OSP. UNCTAD
estimated that the loss on GSP in the US, EEC
and Japan alone would be $2.1 bn while mfn
gains in these markets would be around $1.7 bn
(UNCTAD 1979b: para 45). Another worry was
the failure of the MTN to draw up a code on
safeguards against the discriminatory use of
restrictions on imports from ldcs which would be
an effective legal mechanism for combatting pro-
tectionism rather than one which, on the
contrary, provided a legal backing for the wide-
spread proliferation of restrictive measures
against idcs' exports.
Manufactures
Further measures to promote ldcs' trade in
manufactures and semi-manufactures to the so-
called Lima target (ldcs accounting for 30 per
cent of total world trade in manufactures by the
year 2000), were listed under Agenda item 11.
lia) underlined ldcs' need for financial and
technical assistance in the production and market-
ing of processed goods and manufactures. This
assistance, it was suggested, should be provided
by dc governments and international organisa-
tions, as well as by TNCs. Dcs were also called
upon to improve market access for ldc imports
by eliminating 'within an agreed time-frame'
tariff escalation and other forms of protection,
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both to industries which process idcs' com-
modities and raw materials and those in which
the ldcs have a comparative advantage (UNCTAD
(1) 1979: 44). Ldcs wanted an end to the restric-
tive business practices of TNCs which can act as
a constraint on the marketing of ldc manu-
factures. Since agreement had already been
reached in the UN General Assembly to hold a
conference before April 1980 to negotiate rules
for controlling these practices, item lIb) merely
suggested that the date be brought forward to the
end of 1979, and that the UNCTAD Secretariat
should continue its work in this area.
The GSP was the subject of lic). The 77 felt
that the dynamic effect of the OSP could and
should be increased in three ways. First, it should
be made legally binding for a definite period, so
that withdrawal of concessions would not be
possible without consultation, subjected to multi-
lateral surveillance, and linked to adjustment
measures as well as some form of compensation.
Second, there should be no discrimination
between ldcs and no conditions which imply
reciprocity (an issue which is taken up by Green
in his article). Third, GSP product coverage
should be expanded under a 'time-bound pro-
gramme', tariff quotas eliminated and OSP tariffs
reduced to re-establish preferential margins over
mfn imports.
The demands under lia) to c) were repeated in
lid) which called for a review of the implementa-
tion of two resolutions passed at UNCTAD IV-
one on protectionism (96 [IVI) and the other on
the activities of TNCs (97[IV]). The 77 wanted
Group B to renew their commitment not to
increase trade barriers. The renewal of the Multi-
Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 1978 for four years
was singled out for criticism and Group B was
asked to adopt adjustment policies to remove the
need for extending the MFA beyond 1982. On
TNCs, the 77 sought an undertaking to begin
negotiations on a code of conduct to ensure that
their activities (including restrictive business
practices once again) were not detrimental to
ldc development.
Commodities
Trade in commodities was dealt with under
Agenda item 10. Sub-item lOa) reviewed the pro-
gress on the Integrated Programme for Com-
modities (IPC) adopted at UNCTAD IV, which is
considered in some detail in Chadha's article.
The IPC seeks to establish a series of individual
commodity agreements primarily to stabilise
commodity prices, with the assistance of a finan-
cial organisation known as the Common Fund
(CF). The fundamental elements of the CF were
agreed after lengthy discussions at a negotiating
conference in March 1979. All that remained was
to convert these elements into legal articles of
agreement. an exercise for a group of lawyers
rather than a full-scale conference such as
UNCTAD V. What UNCTAD V could produce,
however, was a commitment to an early date for
the drafting session and a timetable for negotia-
tions on the individual commodity agreements,
where progress had been rather slow. In addition,
the 77 felt that more emphasis should be given to
the role of processing, product development,
marketing and distribution, both in the activities
of the CF and in those of other institutions, such
as the World Bank. They wanted the dcs to
commit themselves to 'a comprehensive frame-
work for international cooperation for expanding
in developing countries the processing of primary
commodities and the export of processed goods'
(UNCTAD (1) 1979: 39). As part of the frame-
work, dcs would agree to run down their pro-
cessing industries, thereby allowing processing to
be expanded in ldcs, and guidelines would be
drawn up to regulate the production of synthetics.
The UNCTAD Secretariat would be asked to
undertake a series of studies to identify what
financial assistance was needed from dcs and
international institutions in this area.
Finally, arising from their fear that the powers of
the CF to influence commodity trade in the short
term would be constrained both by its limited
funds ($400 mn of direct government contribu-
tions instead of the originally suggested $1 bn)
and the number of commodity agreements in
existence (four, of which only one has been
signed since the beginning of the IPC), the 77
wanted another financing facility to be set up.
This would provide compensation for shortfalls in
export earnings from any single commodity and
would be known as the Complementary Financing
Facility.
New markets
The fourth major trade area covered measures to
diversify the direction of ldc trade, in particular
by strengthening trade relations between countries
of different economic and social systems. The
share of ldc exports to the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe (Group D) fell between 1974 and
1977 to less than 4 per cent of total ldc exports
on average (see Table 2). Though not a new
subject, since it was considered at UNCTAD IV,
the 77 felt that growing difficulties in access to
dc markets demanded renewed focus on East
European markets. They proposed that Group D
undertake various measures to increase their
imports from ldcs, including the improvement of
their OSP schemes, the removal of all non-tariff
barriers, the easing of payments arrangements,
and even the adoption of policies to ensure the
growth of demand in their countries for ldc
products.
The potential importance of trade between ldcs
was considered in the broader context of item 18
on economic cooperation among ldcs (ECDC) and
is the subject of the articles by O'Neill and Cable
in this Bulletin. One Group of 77 demand was
that the UNCTAD Secretariat continued its
studies on ways of increasing inter-ldc trade,
which in 1974-77 accounted for only 23 per cent
of total ldc exports. More significantly, the 77
sought to overcome Group B's objections
(expressed at a meeting of UNCTAD's Trade and
Development Board) to a programme of meetings
on ECDC, and to strengthen UNCTAD's role in
the promotion of ECDC both independently and
in coordination with UNDP.
Other issues
Trade was also mentioned in the discussion of
monetary and financial issues (item 12), shipping
(item 14), and special measures to assist the least
developed (item l5a). Since the 77 believe that
reform of the international mónetary system
requires inter alía a revival of world trade and
development, they wanted the IMF to soften the
terms of its Compensatory Financing Facility
(item l2a) and UNCTAD to establish a multi-
lateral export credit guarantee facility for ldcs.
which would help promote and diversify their
exports. On shipping, the ldcs sought the ratifica-
tion of the Code of Conduct for Liner Con-
ferences (see Renouf infra), adopted in 1974,
which requires that a minimum share of liner
trade be reserved for ldcs. They also wanted to
raise the question of freight rates (and surcharges)
which, they argue, are set arbitrarily and tend to
discriminate against some of their commodity
exports. And they hoped to reach agreement with
the dcs on the need to guarantee ldcs a greater
share of the world's bulk tonnage. Lastly, the
substantial new programme of action proposed by
the 77 for the l980s for the least developed
countries called upon Group B to consider an
'integrated package approach' to the development
of their exports. This could entail exemptions of
quotas and other non-tariff barriers for specific
products, promotional schemes, and a deliberate
bias by dc public purchasing agencies in favour of
goods produced by these countries.
19
The Conference
Group of 77 disunity
Despite the extensive preparations in drawing up
the agenda, the Conference was nowhere near as
successful at the 77 had hoped. There was less
debate on the individual items and the results
were less significant than anticipated. One reason
was alleged to be the disunity of the Group of 77
itself which, as Williams shows in his article, is a
fragile organisation. After the meeting at Arusha
in February, a group of ldc experts met in
Geneva partly to convert the Arusha Programme
into a set of draft resolutions for presentation at
UNCTAD V. But this task was apparently not
completed before the Conference opened, and
according to some accounts the 77 had to spend
the first two weeks drawing up their draft resolu-
tions. There is sharp disagreement over whether
or not the slow start to the Conference was due to
disunity among the 77. Certainly dc spokesmen
have used the ambiguity of the situation to divert
attention from the wide differences between ldcs
and dcs. Whatever the cause of the delay, it
meant that time which could have been devoted
to detailed negotiations was wasted in a rather
fruitless debate, in which 166 participants made
statements on the general issues of world
economic development. Even after resolutions had
been tabled and the negotiations begun in eight
groups, the different and sometimes conflicting
interests of the 77 were apparent. The most
obvious case was in the first negotiating group
where certain Latin American representatives
argued at length with the OPEC members on the
need to include the energy issue in the debate on
restructuring the world economy. On trade, differ-
ences of interest did not so much produce open
conflict as a wide variation in the ldcs' commit-
ment to getting resolutions passed. For instance,
the large exporting Asian ldcs, which were
seriously worried by protectionism in dcs, were
determined to leave UNCTAD V with an agree-
ment on this issue [under item 9a)] even at the
expense of compromising some of their other
demands. In contrast, many African ldcs, dis-
appointed with the talks on measures to improve
commodity trade, were prepared to abandon
altogether the negotiations on 9a).
Procedural difficulties
Another problem was that the agenda was repeti-
tive as well as being too long, and this led to
procedural difficulties, exacerbated by the time
constraints. Items 9 and 11 both dealt with the
qeustion of protectionism and adjustment. As
long as disagreement remained on item 9a) which
asked Group B to accept 'negotiations within
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UNCTAD to formulate the measures and policies
that need to be adopted by developed countries
for encouraging the process of adjustment . .
(UNCTAD (1) 1979: 31), there could be little pro-
gress on the suggestion in I la) that 'developed
countries should evolve policies which would
promote . . . adjustment through movement of
factors of production from the areas where
dynamics of comparative advantage is shifting in
favour of ldcs. . . .' (UNCTAD (1) 1979: 43). The
77 thought that this duplication of subjects would
act as a fail-safe mechanism: what could not be
agreed in one negotiating group, or on one item,
might be more successful in another. But this
policy backfired. Agreement on 9a) was not
reached until the last few hours of the Conference
and il a) was dropped entirely. It is possible that if
the clauses on protectionism had been eliminated
the rest of item 11 a), including a proposal by the
Nordic members of Group B to increase donations
to the International Trade Centre in Geneva,
might have been salvaged.
Group B's response
In contrast to the 77, Group B came to Manila
apparently genuinely united after a preparatory
OECD trade committee meeting at which they
had drawn up a set of their own draft resolutions
on items where they were least prepared to make
concessions. They criticised many of the 77's
demands on three grounds: first, that they were
based on incorrect analysis; second, that they
assumed a dirigiste approach which was anathema
to Group B; and third, that they called upon
Group B to bear excessive costs.
These points were well illustrated in the debate on
the three key trade issues: restructuring the world
economy, protectionism and ldc trade in manu-
factures, and reorganising commodity trade. It
was the very different assessments by Group B
and the 77 of the causes of the current world
trade and economic situation which proved
irreconcilable and led to the total failure of
negotiations in Group One. The matter was
referred to UNCTAD for further study. On pro-
tectionism and trade in manufactures, Group B
did not accept the 77's argument that adjustment
measures would be an essential ingredient in any
solution to the world's economic problems. In
their view protectionism was not increasing;
rather there had been a surge in protectionist
demands which had been successfully resisted.
Even where import controls had been necessary
this was not due to a failure to adjust. Adjustment
was a continuous process which had begun a
long time ago. Nor did they accept that the major
constraint on ldcs' exports of manufactures lay in
the conditions of access to dc markets. Instead
they felt the problem derived from the inability
of ldcs to absorb investment. They recommended,
therefore, that ldcs be given assistance in identify-
ing and designing industrial projects.
Group B also rejected the suggestion that a body
be set up in UNCTAD which, on the basis of
sectoral studies, would advise them what
industries they should run down. There was, they
argued, little that governments could do to affect
the process of adjustment. In addition they were
keen to restrict interference, particularly by
UNCTAD, in their domestic policies. During the
negotiations, however, they conceded that the
UNCTAD Secretariat should be asked to set up a
body to review patterns of world trade and pro-
duction, and non-tariff barriers, though there
would be no sector- or country-specific studies
which might lead to pressure being put on dcs to
close down particular industries.
One notable victory for Group B was the decision
that GATT, and not UNCTAD as the 77 had
demanded, be 'invited to examine in an appro-
priate body any case of future protective action
by developed countries against imports from
developing countries' (UNCTAD 1979c Resolu-
tion 131(V), para B5). Not only had the Arusha
Declaration sought to make this an UNCTAD
responsibility, it had also placed emphasis on the
phrase 'whether there are compelling reasons
which make it impossible to avoid such an
action against imports of developing countries'
(UNCTAD (1) 1979: 32), which the finally agreed
resolution omitted. This resistance to increasing
UNCTAD's role in what have traditionally been
GATT's affairs was also reflected in the resolution
passed on the MTN. Group B was not willing to
reopen discussions in UNCTAD on what had been
agreed at GATT (namely tariffs) nor on what was
still being discussed (safeguards). As a com-
promise, however, it was agreed that the Trade
and Development Board be requested to make an
evaluation of the MTN. Other matters on which
no agreement was possible were referred to the
permanent machinery of UNCTAD for further
discussion: measures to promote ldcs' trade in
manufactures, evaluation of the GSP and the
review of progress in implementing two resolu-
tions from UNCTAD IV (on protectionism and
TNCs).
The failure of the lengthy discussions on the GSP
reflected Group B's unwillingness to accept the
costs of compensation and consultation which
they would be bound to meet if the OSP were
made contractual, as the 77 wanted. Group B
offered to confirm their undertaking (already
made in the context of the Framework Agree-
ment at the MTN) not to introduce any
'arbitrary' changes in the GSP without full con-
sultations and added a new commitment to extend
the GSP indefinitely. But no agreement was
possible and this minor concession was lost.
The only point of consensus on item il (manu-
factures) was essentially a procedural one which
was quickly dealt with, determining that the UN
Conference on restrictive practices, which was
already planned to meet before April 1980, be
held in the last quarter 1979. There was no
discussion of the form which legislation on this
issue might take, merely a confirmation that
action was necessary to the extent that restrictive
business practices affect the international trade
and economic development of ldcs.
Part of the resolution on the IPC was likewise
procedural, speeding up the programme for legis-
lative drafting of the CF and individual com-
modity agreements. There was some discussion on
the possibility of fixing specific dates for the final
negotiating conferences on individual agreements.
GrouD B argued that this was the responsibility
of the experts' groups which met to discuss each
commodity. All that could be agreed therefore
was to double efforts to hold preparatory meet-
ings. More important was the reference to
measures which could be undertaken to promote
ldcs' capacities in processing, marketing and dis-
tribution. Agreement was reached on an extensive
list of studies for the UNCTAD Secretary
General to conclude in this area. There was little
progress on the matter of contributions for the
non-buffer stocking activities of the CF, even
though the 77 saw these as being the most
important element of the IPC as long as the
number of commodity agreements remained
small. During the course of the Conference only
seven dcs and six ldcs pledged contributions, and
these amounted to a mere $88 mn, as against
$280 mn of voluntary contributions that was
needed. Most notable was the outright refusal of
some countries, including the US, to commit any
funds.
Three other resolutions concerning commodities
were adopted without dissent. The first called for
a negotiating conference on an international
agreement in tungsten, even though this is not
one of the 18 commodities under the IPC. The
second urged that the negotiations on a new wheat
agreement, in process since February 1978, be
completed as soon as possible. The third stressed
-
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the need for investment and technical assistance
to help ldcs increase their food production.
Group B's aversion to adding new mechanisms
to what they see as UNCTAD's empire was also
evident in their reaction to proposals for a study
of how a complementary financing facility might
operate. Despite the EEC's own STABEX
arrangement, Group B as a whole felt that there
was no economic rationale for such a scheme.
They also pointed out that the IMF/IBRD
Development Committee was already studying
ways of improving the existing Compensatory
Financing Facility. However the 77's resolution
was passed by vote and UNCTAD will undertake
the study.
Group B was thus able to head off any serious
challenge to the status quo, and avoided making
any significant concessions. However even on
issues where they had less interest, and so fewer
objections, the results of the Conference were
disappointing. The lack of movement on what is
known as South-East trade item 17) reflected the
weakness of Group D's contribution to UNCTAD
V. A consensus resolution was produced but this
merely reiterated a similar resolution passed at
UNCTAD IV, three years ago, to the effect that
the practice of ldcs concluding trade and
economic cooperation agreements with Eastern
Europe should be extended. No agreement was
reached on what measures were necessary to
achieve this goal; instead the two draft resolutions
proposed by Group D and the 77 were referred to
the Trade and Development Board for discussion
at its next session.
In contrast the consensus resolution reached on
ECDC (covering the three agenda sub-items
together) was more substantial, though even here
there was little discussion of substance on issues
such as inter-ldc trade preferences. The major
result was a programme for more UNCTAD
work on policies to promote ECDC and for a
series of special meetings on priority areas of
ECDC before a special session of the Committee
on ECDC in early 1980. This resolution was passed
despite Group B's concern that they should not
be excluded from any ECDC action programme
funded by the regular UN budget as this would
contravene the UN's principle of universality. In
recognition of this, the Resolution notes that
while ECDC chiefly concerns ldcs at the sub-
regional, and interregional levels, action is needed
by dcs to help in its implementation at the
international level (UNCTAD 1 979c. Resolution
127(V), para B2). There was no agreement on
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Group B's other concern, however, that the more
advanced ldcs should be excluded from preferen-
tial treatment by the less advanced ldcs.
Finally, on shipping, the only consensus resolu-
tion was a weak one, merely calling upon those
countries which have not yet done so to ratify the
1974 UN Code of Conduct for Liners. The
UNCTAD Secretariat is also to continue collect-
ing information on the level and structure of liner
tariffs. There was no agreement between Group
B, Group D and the 77 on the latter's proposals
for a Code of Conduct for bulk trade, nor for
increased assistance to the ldcs in the development
of their merchant fleets. These resolutions were
therefore adopted by vote, which means that they
are not binding on the dcs, although they do
commit the UNCTAD Secretariat to identify ways
in which ldc participation in bulk cargo might be
increased, to study the feasibility of establishing
a legal mechanism for regulating the operations of
open-registry fleets, and to set up a unit to assist
ldcs with feasibility studies for ship acquisition.
ConclusionsWhither UNCTAD?
It is difficult to be positive about the results of
UNCTAD V on trade issues. Certainly it does
not appear to have been as successful as
UNCTAD IV in introducing new mechanisms to
promote ldcs' trade. In the opinion of the Presi-
dent of the Conference, General Romulo, the
Conference failed to produce either major vic-
tories or major defeats. Of the nine sub-items,
four were referred to the Trade and Development
Board for further consideration, one was voted,
three were passed as consensus resolutions but
with little more than procedural value, while the
one other consensus resolution was a much-
weakened version of the original Group of 77
proposal. This was resolution 131(V) on protec-
tionism. Most of the consensus resolutions were
those with little at stake for any group of
countries, or on which agreement had already
been reached elsewhere. Where new ideas were
introduced these were referred for further study
or negotiation at future conferences.
Such unsatisfactory results are due to the diffuse
nature of the agenda and of the negotiations.
Instead of focusing on one or two issues where
ldc consensus was possible, as at Nairobi, the 77
aimed their demands too wide and then failed to
support each other on all of them. In contrast,
Group B was generally well-organised and united.
The world economic recession reinforced its
members' resolve not to make any concessions to
the 77 which might prove costly either in terms
of increased assistance or lost economic choice.
As long as this unity is maintained it will be
difficult for the 77 to make any progress at
future meetings, for instance of the Trade and
Development Board, on issues blocked at
UNCTAD V. One solution may be for the 77
to increase their solidarity and to demonstrate
their collective strength, for example as a market
for dc manufactures and as a source of dc raw
material imports. The need for such solidarity and
its prospects for success are dwelt upon in the
O'Neill and Cable articles.
Nevertheless there will be a follow-up to
UNCTAD V. First there is UNCTAD's work
programme. The most important political element
of this may be the annual review of developments
in world trade which, under pressure from the 77,
may become sector- and country-specific, despite
Group B's hard fight to have this removed from
the final resolution. Second there are the con-
ferences which continue to meet to discuss both
specific issues and the more general problems of
the NIEO. In this context UNCTAD may be seen
as a milestone, marking out time, rather than a
turning point Finally there will be UNCTAD VI
where many of the same issues will reappear-
protectionism and ECDC in particular. As
UNCTAD's Secretary General remarked, 'What
we hoped to get out of UNCTAD V. . . was not
perhaps solutions to the agenda items but the
initiation of negotiating processes similar to those
launched at Nairobi' (UN 1979).
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